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Introduction
1 After the demise of Milosevic’s regime and the parliamentary elections of December 2000
that followed, the political parties gathered in the anti-Milosevic coalition won more than
2/3 of the parliamentary seats, enabling them to radically change the Serbian political
system and state structure. Soon after these elections, however, internal bickering among
the ruling political elite began. It took 6 years to enact a Constitution and thus lay the
foundation  for  the  new  democratic  state.  Weak  governments,  internal  and  external
political  instability,  the institution of  a Partycracy (Partitocrazia (it.)  -  referring to the
monopolisation  of  state  institutions  by  political  parties),  patronage,  the  consequent
erosion of legitimacy of government institutions, the de-ideologisation of politics, and the
political free-riding of the anti-system opposition comprised the ugly face of what could
otherwise be branded the story of a relatively successful economic and social recovery.
The aim of this paper is to point out the main obstacles impeding rapid democratisation
and the overall development of Serbia.
2 One of the greatest obstacles to the further consolidation of democracy in Serbia is the
continuous appeal of nationalism among the Serbian population. At the same time, a
“blocked political system” has had a corrosive effect on the country’s institutions.1 One of
the  most  obvious  manifestations  of  the  “blocked  political  system”  is  the  de  facto
impossibility of the most popular political party, the Serbian Radical Party2, to participate
in government. 
3 This statement is seemingly paradoxical when bearing in mind the particular situation in
Serbia, the nationalist profile of SRS and its past performance. In fact, in 2000 Serbia
found itself in a partially lose-lose situation with regard to the prospect of building its
democracy and rule of law. Integrating the political parties of the ancien régime into the
state  institutions  and government  was  (and arguably remains)  too  dangerous  in  the
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politically unstable situation existing in the immediate aftermath of the regime change.
Simultaneously, however, Serbia finds itself in a deformed political system thanks in part
to the taboo-isation of collaboration with the ruling parties of the Milosevic period. The
country’s political  landscape is made up of a permanent ruling political  block3 and a
permanent  opposition.4 In  this  way,  Serbia  has  failed  to  experience  what  is  usually
considered in political theory one of the fundamental preconditions for reaching the next
step  in  the  democratisation  process:  a  genuine  alternation  of  power  (“government
turnover”) since the fall of Milosevic.5
4 Through an overview of  the relationship between the ruling democratic parties6,  the
international  community,  and  the  Radicals,  this  paper  will  attempt  to  answer  the
question of whether the cost of this “blocked political system” (i.e. immobile democracy)
is higher than the continuous exclusion of the SRS from power. In this way, the paper will
touch upon some fundamental dilemmas of political theory such as the toleration of the
intolerant and the role of the international factor in the democratisation process of a
country. Moreover, a short overview of the theories of democratisation will be used to
define the “blocked political system” phenomenon.  The methodological approach of this
paper  draws  on  an  analysis  of  a  general  theory  of  democratisation,  and  a  politico-
historical analysis of Serbia from 2000-2008. 
5 The essay is divided into five parts. Section 2 focuses on the domestic and international de
facto prevention of the SRS from participating in any of the post-Milosevic governments.
The most extensive section, Section 3, deliberates on the negative effects of the lack of
government turnover in Serbia, concentrating on the lack of respect for the independent
parliamentary mandate,  the deligitimisation of the institution of the President of the
Republic, and the obstructionist role of the factions of the post-Milosevic political elite in
the fight against powerful organised crime networks in Serbia. Section 4 touches on the
debate over the relationship between the geopolitical orientation of a country and its
democratisation process, while also exploring the effect of government turnover on the
success  of  a  country’s  transition.  Finally,  concluding  remarks  (including  a  brief
consideration of the future political developments in the country) are set out in Section 5.
 
The taboo of the Radicals’ participation in power
6 In the initial  period of  Serbia’s  post-Milosevic  transition (up until  the parliamentary
elections of December 2003) the SRS was on the margins of the political life of a nation
dominated by the disputes between the two main democratic parties:  the Democratic
Party (hereinafter DS) and the Democratic Party of Serbia (hereinafter DSS). Concerning
the results  of  the parliamentary elections  held in  December 2000,  the Radicals  were
seemingly on a path of increasing political irrelevance, receiving only 8.5% of the vote. 
7 Yet,  the  ‘permanent’  opposition  parties,  primarily  the  Radicals,  were  the  obvious
beneficiaries of the infighting between the two Democratic parties in the sense that they
were able to free ride on the back of the “blocked political system”.  Being permanently in
opposition,  the  protest  vote  was  almost  automatically  channelled  towards  them.
Consequently, in the 2003 and 2007 parliamentary elections, the SRS was the strongest
party in the National Assembly, gaining 27.7% and 28.7% of the vote respectively. The
failed November 2003 Presidential  elections7 following the assassination of late Prime
Minister Djindjic (12 March 2003) marked the steady rise of the SRS. The SRS’ comeback
was  confirmed  in  the  June  2004  Presidential  elections  where  although  Boris  Tadic
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(president of the DS) triumphed, Nikolic finished second, winning 1,431,833 votes (or 45%)
– which was the highest count for the Radicals since the fall of Milosevic. In the second
round of  the  2008 Presidential  elections  Nikolic  won 2,  177,  872  votes  (47.9%)  while
incumbent President Boris Tadic garnered 2, 294, 605 votes (50.5%).
8 The  reasons  for  the  electoral  ‘comeback’  of  the  SRS  are varied  but  the  majority  of
observers attribute it to voters’ dissatisfaction with the nature of the reforms in Serbia.8
Usually  the  bulk  of  the  SRS  electoral  is  identified  with  the  so-called  losers  in  the
transition  process.  In  the  foreign  academic  and  political  literature  on  Serbia,  the
perception of the political divide is dominated by a distinction between “nationalists” and
“reformers.” Such a depiction of Serbia’s political system is incomplete as it undermines
the  importance  of  social  and class  distinctions  among Serbian voters.  In  a  study on
post-2000 Serbian political parties, Zoran Slavujevic argues that 65% of Serbia’s poorest
vote for the Radicals. Moreover, the author shows how the Radicals, as with the Socialists,
enjoy support of social groups usually referred to as ‘losers in the transition process’;
thus, both parties enjoy the support of the working class, agricultural workers, the oldest,
the least educated and the poor.9
9 Despite the fact that the parties which were in power during the 1990s never won enough
votes  to  form  a  government  independently,  on  several  occasions,  due  to  key
disagreements between the DS and DSS, Kostunica’s party was tempted to join forces
either with the SRS or SPS. However, this did not happen due to the exclusion of the
Radicals from power, which was the result of both exogenous and endogenous factors. 
10 The  boycott  of  the  Radicals  has  been  two-pronged:  international  and  domestic.  The
international community and its policies towards Serbia are marked by a de facto veto
that pressures the ‘democratic’ political parties to refuse cooperation with the Radicals at
the national level.  As far as Serbian internal politics is concerned, the post-Milosevic
ruling political elite often uses popular fear of the Radicals as an essential component of
its own political campaign, thus legitimising its claim to governance. The exclusion of the
Radicals (or the Socialists) from power at the national level justifies branding Serbia’s
political system as “blocked” because it precludes the possibility of a genuine government
turnover.
11 To illustrate international reactions to the attempt of Serbia’s post-Milosevic parties (i.e.
DSS) to break the taboo of forming a governing alliance with the SRS or the SPS, this
section will  concentrate on the four most  significant  examples.  Concerning domestic
attitudes towards the Radicals, it is sufficient to focus on the 2008 Presidential election
campaign.
12 In the aftermath of the parliamentary elections held in December 2003, the DSS and its
coalition partners formed a minority government supported by the Socialists on the 3rd of
March 2004 after marathon negotiations failed to form a majority government comprised
only  of  post-Milosevic  parties.  During  these  negotiations,  representatives  of  the
international community pressured the DSS and their potential partners in the minority
government to not make arrangements with Milosevic’s party.10 Despite the fact that the
government depended on support from the SPS, it managed to extradite numerous war
crime suspects to the ICTY (by applying the strategy of voluntary surrender) and in this
way gained the confidence (albeit limited) of the Euro-Atlantic partners.
13 The strategy of voluntary surrender reached its limit in the case of indicted Bosnian Serb
General, Ratko Mladic. The inability to apprehend him led to a phased ending of the first
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Kostunica government in 2006.11 Arguably, international pressure made it difficult for
parts of the DSS (that were ready to fully include the Socialists in the government) to
convince opponents to break the taboo and share the reigns of power with the structures
of the old regime. Nevertheless, the functioning of the executive branch was to indirectly
depend on the SPS. Though the Socialists participated indirectly in power in the post-
Milosevic period, direct political arrangements of any kind made with the SRS remained
taboo.
14 This taboo was partially broken after the September 2004 municipal elections, in which
the Radicals  made a  solid showing.12 As  a  consequence,  former members  of  the DOS
formed coalitions with ex-regime parties in several municipalities. The only large city
won by the SRS was Novi Sad, where Radical party candidate Maja Gojkovic managed to
defeat the DS candidate in the second round of the mayoral elections.13 Not only were the
Radicals to hold the position of the Mayor, but the majority of the municipal council was
also formed thanks to the votes of municipal councillors from the DSS.14 International
opposition  to  cooperation  with  forces  of  the  ex-regime  continued;  EU  and  US
Ambassadors refrained from publicly meeting the Mayor of Novi Sad. Asked why he did
not meet Mayor Maja Gojkovic, Michael Polt, former US Ambassador to Serbia, said that
the US administration refuses to talk with officials who oppose cooperation with ICTY or
democratic changes in society.15
15 Furthermore, towards the conclusion of negotiations on the formation of the current
Serbian government, Tomislav Nikolic, acting head of the SRS16, was elected Speaker of
the Serbian Parliament on 7 May 2007. Nikolic won a comfortable majority, backed by the
Socialists  and  the  Democratic  Party  of  Serbia  of  outgoing  Prime  Minister  Vojislav
Kostunica.  DSS's support for Nikolic was seen by many as a possible precursor to an
alliance with the Radicals; however, this move appeared to be more a strategic ploy to
position  the  DSS  more  favourably  within  the  new  ‘grand  coalition’  dominated  by
Ministers from Tadic’s DS. European Union Officials and the international press overtly
disapproved of Nikolic’s election, arguing that by this Serbia had “lurched back towards
the pariah status of the 1990s.”17 Oli Rehn, the EU’s Enlargement Commissioner stated,
“[t]he election of an ultra-nationalist as Serbia's parliamentary speaker is a worrying
sign."  As a  consequence of  Nikolic’s  election the EU postponed the signing of  a  visa
facilitation agreement with Serbia, and the Council of Europe postponed the ceremony of
raising the Serbian flag to mark the upcoming Serbian Presidency over the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe. Facing an imminent vote for a new president of the
Serbian parliament, and the second government of Vojislav Kostunica, Nikolic resigned
five days later.
16 Finally, on the eve of runoff voting in the 2008 Presidential elections, the EU continued to
exert moderate pressure on Serbian voters to choose Tadic over Nikolic. The decision to
delay (until after the second round of voting) an opportunity for Serbia to sign a political
agreement  with the EU on trade liberalization,  visa liberalization and education was
interpreted as implicit pressure on Serbian voters to vote against the Radical candidate.
Asked whether a political agreement with Serbia would be signed even if Nikolic wins in
the elections, Javier Solana replied, “[u]ntil the Serbian government stays on the road it is
today there is no reason for a change in our positions.”18 Thus, apart from the attempt to
boost Tadic in the presidential race, the intention of the EU was probably to ensure that
even in case Nikolic triumphed, the present government would not be replaced by a new
parliamentary  majority  that  included  the  Radicals.  Janez  Jansa,  the  Slovenian  Prime
“Blocked political system”: Serbia 2000-2008
Balkanologie, Vol. XI, n° 1-2 | 2008
4
Minister, gave a statement in this regard. Jansa explained that the EU would respect the
results of the Serbian Presidential elections, but stated that “the results of the elections
will probably have an impact on the speed” of Serbia’s EU integration. Similar statements
were issued from the EU on the eve of the extraordinary parliamentary elections in May
2008.
17 After a short overview of several instances in which the Radicals came close to power
sharing  but  were  denied  this  opportunity  due  to  a  combination  of  international
opposition and the hostility  of  domestic  political  forces,  the paper will  focus on the
political and institutional effects of the exclusion of the Radicals from government, and
will in this way illustrate the “blocked political system” in Serbia. 
 
Blocked Political System: a tempest in a tea-cup
18 As a result of the preclusion of government turnover due to the exclusion of the Radicals
and Socialists from power, the space for political maneuver was narrowed significantly.
Thus, political struggle was dominated by the post-Milosevic parties: primarily the DS of
President Tadic, and Prime Minister Kostunica’s DSS. As a result, the National Assembly,
the Constitutional Court, the Office of the President of the Republic, other institutions,
and even the Radicals and Socialists were merely instruments in this clash. This situation
led not only to the crumbling of the legitimacy of the aforementioned institutions but
also resulted in a significant political blow to the parties in power.19
19 The ‘permanent’ opposition parties, primarily the Radical Party, were and remain the
obvious beneficiary of this blocked political system.20
20 In Serbia’s case of, proof that participation in power during a transition process almost
automatically leads to a decrease in political popularity can be found in the results of the
January 2008 presidential elections. Namely, the vote in municipalities where Radicals
hold power swung in favour of the incumbent president and vice versa.21
21 Internal bickering among the DOS coalition started immediately after the 5th of October
2000 when two sides of the victorious coalition decided to make power arrangements
with different parts of Milosevic’s security services.22 Not even the assassination of the
Serbian Prime Minister Djindjic managed to achieve at least a temporary union of the two
democratic parties.  In reaction to the assassination, Kostunica refused to support the
imposition of  a state of  emergency and,  quite surprisingly for this  political  moment,
proposed the formation of a government that would gather together all political forces,
including the Radicals and the Socialists. 
22 The nature of Serbia’s political system as well as the behavior of its major actors has
contributed to a  deviation from a model  of  representative democracy leading to the
entrenchment of certain negative trends such as the establishment of a system whereby
political parties have absolute control over the civil administration and judicial system
(including the appointments and behavior of the aforementioned). Illustrative examples
of the deformation of Serbia’s democracy are the lack of respect for the independent
parliamentary mandate, the obstructionist behavior of political parties during the failed
presidential elections in 2002 and 2003, a lack of political agreement to elect members of
the Constitutional  Court  of  Serbia,  and the DSS’  obstructionist  approach to Djindjic’s
attempts to reform the country’s  criminal  code which aimed to strengthen the fight
against organized crime.
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 Limited independence of parliamentary mandate
23 Before we embark on an analysis of the limitations on the freedom of the parliamentary
mandate in Serbia, it is important to give some background.
24 In the summer of 2001, the political struggle between the DS, the DSS and the rest of the
DOS  coalition  broke  out  into  the  open.  Slobodan  Milosevic  was  extradited  to  the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter ICTY) on 28 June
2001.  The  DSS  and  its  Ministers  in  the  Djindjic  government  publicly  contested  the
extradition of Slobodan Milosevic to the ICTY. Moreover, the judges of the Constitutional
Court  (most  of  them appointed during the regime of  Milosevic)  opposed the Serbian
government’s decree to extradite Milosevic to the ICTY, and thus acted on the basis of a
provision in the 1992 Constitution of  the Federal  Republic of  Yugoslavia (equally the
creation of Milosevic’s regime) that stated in article 17.3, “[a] Yugoslav citizen may not be
deprived of his citizenship, deported from the country, or extradited to another state.”23
 As a consequence of this decision, Djindjic and the government of the Republic of Serbia
were forced to circumvent the Federal authorities and take a legally dubious but arguably
justifiable political decision to extradite Milosevic to the ICTY.
25 The Constitution,  in article 16.2,  left  room for a different interpretation proclaiming,
“International treaties which have been ratified and promulgated in conformity with the
present  Constitution  and  generally  accepted  rules  of  international  law  shall  be  a
constituent part of the internal legal order.”  In this sense, the legality of Milosevic’s
extradition to this particular tribunal could be justified since the ICTY was instituted in
May 1993 on the basis of the UN Security Council Resolution 827 as an international body,
not a foreign state. 
26 Prior to the summer of  2001,  Djindjic  was trying to get  the support  of  Montenegrin
Federal MPs in order to enact a law that would change the constitution to create the legal
possibility  for  the  extradition,  but  he  was  unable  to  acquire  this  support  from  the
political opposition of federalist Montenegrins, who were allies of Milosevic in the past.
Since the pressures of the international community to extradite Milosevic persisted, and
thanks  to  the  support  of  the  Serbian  Ministers  in  the  Federal  government,  the
government (of the then federal unit of Serbia) issued a decree allowing the arrest. 
27 Milosevic’s extradition led to a split between the DSS and the DS. Consequently, the DOS
coalition  in  the  Serbian  parliament  remained  without  the  support  of  45  DSS
parliamentarians  (from a  total  of  176  MPs).  The  weakened coalition was  still  strong
enough to support a governmental majority but made the entire legislative process more
difficult because the government was vulnerable to the demands of numerous smaller
parties  in  the  DOS.  In  order  to  strengthen  parliamentary  support  for  the  DOS
Government,  the  DS  and  their  allies  in  the  DOS  coalition  decided  to  expel  DSS
parliamentarians from the Parliament. In June 2002, 21 MPs from the DSS, together with
parliamentarians  from  other  parties  in  the  DOS  coalition,  were  replaced  by  new
parliamentarians  on  the  basis  of  a  decision  of  the  Administrative  Committee  of  the
Serbian National Assembly.24 The rationale for the decision was irregular attendance at
the  parliamentary  plenary  sessions  and  committee  meetings  by  the  aforementioned
members  of  the  parliament.  Soon  after,  the  Federal  Constitutional  Court  annulled
Parliament’s decision. 
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28 With  regards  to  the  Federal  Court  decision,  Stefano Saninno,  the  Head  of  the  OSCE
Mission to Serbia at the time, gave implicit support to the principle of “legalism”, upheld
by Kostunica and his party. The position of the OSCE continued to provoke controversy in
the following months.25
29 The DS’s immediate reaction to the ruling of the Federal Court was to expel all 45 DSS
MPs. The legal interpretation justifying the decision found ground in article 88 of the Law
on the Election of  Representatives of  the Republic  of  Serbia.  Article  88 gives several
reasons justifying the termination of the mandate of an elected representative before the
expiration of his/her term. For example: “if  his membership in the political party or
coalition of parties on whose electoral list he was elected is terminated” (Art. 88.1) and “if
the political  party,  or the other political  organization on whose electoral  list  he was
elected, removes his name from the register kept by its competent body” (Art. 88.9).26 DS
representatives claimed that DSS breached the DOS coalition agreement requesting each
member of the coalition to support the government, and that DOS Presidency legitimately
reacted by expelling DSS from the coalition. Representatives of the DSS protested this
decision, arguing that the DOS coalition was never registered as a legal entity or entered
into the registry of political parties, and that consequently “the DOS Presidency, as an
informal body,  does not have the right to dispose of parliamentary mandates.”27 DSS
representatives accused the DS of a “mini coup d’êtat”.28 As a reaction to this, the DSS
tried to protect its rights via domestic legal procedures, but it also requested the opinion
of  the OSCE and the Council  of  Europe.  Later,  high officials  of  the DS acknowledged
previous OSCE conclusions that considered laws limiting the liberty of a parliamentary
mandate  contrary  to  international  standards;  however,  they  maintained  that  OSCE
representatives also confirmed that the decision to strip 45 DSS deputies of their mandate
complied with the legal requirements of the Serbian system.29
30 On the eve of the failed 2002 presidential elections and the restructuring of the Yugoslav
Federation into the state Union of Serbia and Montenegro, Kostunica and Djindjic reached
an agreement that led to the return of the DSS deputies to the Parliament on 5 November
2002.30 Thus, an essentially legal dispute was annulled by a political agreement between
bitter political  opponents who had once been post-Milosevic allies.  Such an outcome
certainly did not help the ratings of the two democratic parties and inevitably led to a
deterioration in the perceived legitimacy of state institutions. 
31 According  to  Goran  Svilanovic  (former  Foreign  Minister  of  the  Federal  Republic  of
Yugoslavia and the state union of Serbia and Montenegro, ex-leader of the Civic Alliance
member of the DOS coalition, and a member in the DOS negotiating team that reached the
aforementioned political agreement with DSS) evicting DSS parliamentarians from the
National Assembly remains one of the most serious political errors of DOS. “…I think that
this was at the time legally possible … but politically unsustainable … and deeply wrong”,
maintains Svilanovic.31
32 The legal discussion over the ownership of the parliamentary mandate materialized in
the 27 May 2003 decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia to declare
the  controversial  paragraphs  1  and  9  of  Article  88  of  the  Law  on  the  Election  of
Representatives  of  the  Republic  of  Serbia  unconstitutional.  The  Court’s  decision
addressed the issue as to whether a mandate belongs to the elected parliamentarian or to
the political party of which he is a member, and decided in favour of the independent
parliamentary mandate. Moreover, the Venice Commission and the OSCE/ODHIR in their
Joint  Recommendations  on  the  Laws  on  Parliamentary,  Presidential  and  Local  Elections,  and
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Electoral  Administration  in  the  Republic  of  Serbia,  welcomed the decision of  the Serbian
Constitutional  Court  concluding,  “[o]nce  elected,  deputies  should  be  accountable
primarily to the voters who elected them, not to their political party. The fact that a
deputy has resigned from or has been expelled from the party should therefore not entail
their expulsion from parliament.”32 Furthermore, the joint recommendation stated that
such a legal provision contradicted the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document, paragraph 7.9,
arguing, “should the law be amended in this area in the future, new provisions should
ensure that  mandates  of  elected representatives  belong to them and not  to  political
parties on which lists they were elected.” 
33 After the December 2003 parliamentary elections, the constitution of the new Parliament
and the formation of the first Kostunica government, the problem of an independent
parliamentary mandate did not disappear from political life in Serbia. Kostunica’s fragile
minority  government  depended on the vote  of  every single  deputy which was  often
threatened by the individual decisions of parliamentarians switching sides. Allegations
were made that powerful business interests virtually “buy” parliamentarians and their
loyalty.33 During this period, the Serbian National Assembly was often jokingly referred to
as  a  ‘stock-market’,  where  MPs  played the  roles  of  stocks  and shares.  Almost  every
political  party in  the government  and the opposition experienced “betrayals”  in  the
parliament.  In  this  way,  political  parties  that  did  not  even  participate  in  the  2003
elections were awarded parliamentary seats. Serbian political parties revealed that they
had forced their future deputies to sign blanco resignations prior to the constitution of
the post-election (2003) parliament. This instrument was (in one instance, at least) used
to save the parliamentary majority of the first Kostunica government. As a result, the DSS
followed the path of the previous government majority and violated European standards
on the rights and obligations of parliamentarians, thus seriously injuring the democratic
legitimacy of the Serbian Parliament.34
 
The legitimacy of the Office of the President of the Republic of
Serbia
34 Due to the principle of legal continuity with Milosevic’s system that prevailed in the
aftermath of the regime-change,  numerous laws and regulations from Milosevic’s era
remained in use.  The Law on the Election of the President of the Republic of Serbia,
enacted  in  1992,  was  one  of  these  acts.  In  this  way,  Milosevic’s  conception  of  the
institution of the President of the Republic was imposed on the new democratic system. 
35 Article  6 of  this  Law proscribed:  “The elected President of  the Republic  shall  be the
candidate who wins the majority of votes of voters who voted, if at least one half of the
total number of voters in the Republic turned out in the elections.”35 As a result of this
law, citizens of Serbia voted in three presidential elections that failed to elect a President.
36 This law was changed immediately after the first failed presidential elections, abolishing
the turnout requirement in the 2nd round. Yet, the number of citizens who voted in the
first round of the December 2002 and November 2003 elections was already lower than
50%. At the beginning of 2004, the 50% turnout requirement was completely abolished. 
37 The first election of the President of the Republic of Serbia was held in September and the
second round in October 2002. The results of the first round were the following: Vojislav
Kostunica 31.2%;  Miroljub Labus 27.7%;  Vojislav Seselj  22.5% with a  voter  turnout  of
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55.7%. Kostunica and Labus entered the second round winning 66.68% and 31.06% of the
vote respectively. However, voter turnout in the second round (45.53%) was insufficient
to validate the result. The second re-run election was held in December 2002, whereby
Kostunica won 57.5% of the vote while SRS leader Seselj earned 36.3% (with a turnout of
45.1%). Finally, a third re-run of presidential elections took place in November 2003. Once
more, the turnout (38.6%) was lower than the required legal minimum. Nikolic won 46.9%
and the DOS candidate Micunovic got 35.3%.36
38 The reasons for the low voter turnout are varied. The failure of the elections was partially
due to low motivation on the part of the citizens perhaps owing to the relatively limited
constitutional powers of the institution of the President. Yet, many argued that to a large
extent responsibility for such a voter turnout could be ascribed to the DS and Djindjic
because of the 2002 elections and to Kostunica for the failed presidential elections of
November 2003. On both occasions the two democratic parties used obstructionism to
prevent the opposing candidate from winning.  As a result,  Milan Milutinovic,  an old
Milosevic ally who was elected President of Serbia in 1997, remained in office until the
end of 2002. Milutinovic was sent to the detention centre of the ICTY at the beginning of
2003  and Serbia  was  thus  to  remain without  a  President  until  the  summer  of  2004.
Continuous  warnings  from  the  Serbian  Constitutional  Court  failed  to  put  sufficient
pressure on the political elite to change this situation. The Constitutional Court was in
turn blocked because of an insufficient quorum (some judges had retired) for almost two
years due to the inability of the political elite to reach an agreement on the election of
new judges.
39 Cedomir Jovanovic, leader of the Liberal Democratic Party and a close partner of the late
Prime Minister Djindjic, in referring to the first failed presidential elections admitted that
the obstruction of the electoral process presented a strategic political choice for the DS:
“[t]omorrow [after the first round of presidential elections 29 September 2002] a meeting
was held in the government building where we discussed the election results and the
forthcoming second round. We agreed that we couldn’t win against Kostunica with our
candidate [Labus],  but using the minimum turnout requirement would mean that the
election  would  not  be  successful  since  the  number  of  people  voting  would  not  be
sufficient.”37 The DS’s candidate was nominally Labus, however, many argue that the DS
and Djindjic offered only lukewarm support to Labus’ candidacy fearing that his victory
would strengthen the G17 Plus (then a group of experts and now a political party in
Serbia).38 If one is to take this statement at face value, and statistical data justify such
conclusions39,  then even ideological excuses justifying the vote against Kostunica as a
vote  against  the  policies  of  the  ex-regime  cannot  apply.  Labus  was  considered
undoubtedly a pro-European reformer, yet the DS party machine barely supported him. 
40 The fear of losing primacy within the democratic block determined the actions of both
the DS and DSS. In the context of Serbia’s blocked political system, a dominant position
among  the democratic  parties  ensured  automatic  participation  in  government.  An
alliance and a gradual homogenization of the democratic block would necessarily result
in an ‘either/or political choice’ - between a united block of post-Milosevic parties and
the Radicals and Socialists. The internal dynamics of the blocked political system proved
to be incompatible with such a scenario,  for the invisible political  line drawn in the
aftermath of October 5th had to be crossed sooner or later. As we already demonstrated, a
combination of international and domestic pressure prevented the DSS from forming a
coalition with the Radicals, for such a coalition would have inevitably left the democratic
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political space open to the absolute domination of the DS and other smaller parties with
an uncompromising  pro-European orientation,  and would  have  left  the  DSS  with  an
uncertain future exposed to the centripetal forces of a coalition with the much stronger
Radicals. The May 2008 parliamentary elections and their aftermath will be a test of this
scenario. 
41 Misuse  of  the  parliament,  ignoring  the  decision  of  both  Federal  and  Serbian
Constitutional Courts, obstructionism during the presidential elections and the absurd
situation of a country without an elected president for almost two years had a spillover
effect  on the pace of  reforms in the country.  Corruption is  one illustrative example.
According to the findings of Transparency International, corruption in Serbia remains
high (despite moderate improvement since 2000),  occupying the 79th position on the
Corruption Perceptions Index for 2007.40 With respect to other countries in the region,
Serbia lags behind Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, but is ahead of Macedonia, Albania, and
Montenegro. 
 
Obstructionism in the struggle against organized crime
42 The influence of the security services on the course of Serbia’s development remains,
according to some authors, the main obstacle to Serbia’s successful transition: 
43 In most countries, even in the Balkans, security agencies take orders from their political
masters, but in Serbia this is reversed. [ ] This is the most important explanation for
Serbia's present state,  and its unique position in comparison with its neighbors.  This
explains Serbia's failure to arrest fugitive General Ratko Mladic and other war crimes
suspects. For them, keeping Serbia away from European integration is not just a matter of
ideology, but of their very survival. 41
44 The links between security services and organised crime networks are indissoluble. The
support  that  both  gave  to  the  popular  uprising  on  the  5th of  October  2000 42 offer
organized  criminal  gangs  and  corrupt  parts  of  the  secret  services  the  legitimacy  to
continue their activities in the post-2000 period. This presented a serious impediment to
the attempts of the Djindjic government to reinforce the rule of law in the country, which
would have in turn assured, inter alia, effective cooperation with the ICTY. Additionally,
perceived organised crime links and the persistence of  mafia-related murders on the
streets  of  post-Milosevic  Serbia  had  a  negative  impact  on  both  the  internal  and
international image of the first post-Milosevic Serbian government, most notably on the
DS and its leader, Djindjic.
45 An example of the government’s powerlessness against criminal and security interests
was illustrated in the November 2001 rebellion of the Unit for Special Operations, the so-
called “Red berets” of the Serbian intelligence agency. (The same people who organized
this rebellion are now sentenced for having organised and conducted the 12 March 2003
assassination of Prime Minister Djindjic).43 The rebellious Unit had issued the following
political  demand:  resignation  of  Djindjic’s  Minister  of  the  Interior  and  head  of  the
Intelligence  Service  etc.  Kostunica,  in  the  capacity  of  the  President  of  the  Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia at the time, publicly justified the rebellion, thus consciously or
unconsciously sided with the criminals. As a result of the Djindjic government’s inability
to fully oppose the demands of the Unit for Special Operations and crush the rebellion, a
compromise was reached: the Minister of the Interior was to keep his position, but the
head of the intelligence Service loyal to Djindjic and his government had to go. After
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having lost all control of the secret service apparatus, Djndjic decided to crush the Unit
for Special Operations and allied mafia clans, declaring 2002 the year of the fight against
organised crime.  
46 Consequently, the Djindjic government adopted the Law on the Fight Against Organized
Crime in July 2002. However, in order for this law to be implemented, it first had to be
included in the Code on Criminal Procedure, which was at the time under the jurisdiction
of the Federal state. One of the main novelties of the law was the introduction of the
institution of  “collaborator  of  justice”,  a  legal  instrument which comparative studies
demonstrated as having a devastating effect on organized crime networks. Parallel to the
adoption  of  these  legislative  changes  Djndjic’s  government  launched  an  operation
targeting members of the criminal gang willing to testify against their previous partners.
This action achieved some success when the government located a key member of the
clan willing to cooperate with the prosecuting team. Yet, in order for this cooperation to
have full effect, the adoption of the law and the introduction the “collaborator of justice”
was an absolute priority. 
47 The  balance  of  power  in  the  Federal  Assembly  did  not  correspond  to  that  in  the
parliament  of  Serbia.  Kostunica’s  DSS  and  their  Montenegrin  federalist  allies  held
decisive sway over the parliamentary majority and refused to vote for the new law that
would  have  introduced  changes  necessary  for  the  fight  against  organised  crime.
Obstructionism in the Federal Parliament  lasted until December 2002 when DSS finally
decided to support the bill as proposed by the Djindjic government. This was possibly the
consequence of  a  trade-off  in  which Djndjic’s  political  block decided to restitute  the
parliamentary mandates taken from the DSS in return for a cooperative stance in both
Federal and Serbian parliaments – including a positive vote on the Law on the Fight
Against  Organized  Crime  and  the  ensuing  changes  to  the  Federal  Code  on  Criminal
Procedure.44
48 Prime Minister Djindjic’s fight against organized crime and the corrupt security services
ended tragically with his assassination on the 12th of March 2003. A victory in the fight
against  the  security  and  criminal  structures  that  organized  and  conducted  the
assassination of the PM materialised in the sentencing of the organizers and perpetrators.
49 The nature of the overthrow of Milosevic’s regime and the participation of parts of the
ex-regime’s  security  services  in  the  entire  process  largely  shaped  further  political
developments in Serbia. Yet, gradual improvement was possible, though not without a
common  policy  between  the  DOS  and  DSS.  Reform of  the  security  structures  was  a
priority in which the post-Milosevic political elite had to reach consensus. Though it is
true that the political responsibility for the instrumentalisation of Milosevic’s security
structures  lies  with  both  democratic  parties,  as  we  have  seen,  a  larger  part  of  the
responsibility lies with Kostunica’s DSS.
 
Government turnover vs. stability
50 In young democracies “government turnover” is seen positively not only in the sense that
it renders state institutions less vulnerable to the power of private business interests, but
also because it reinforces the legitimacy of democratic procedures, showing citizens that
their vote counts and can lead to government change.45
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51 In  the  Trade,  Equity,  and  Development  Project  of  the  Carnegie  Endowment  for
International Peace, a group of authors argue that “political turnover has been a healthy
development for governance in Eastern Europe”.46 Through simple game theory and cost
and benefit analysis, the authors concluded that due to the risk of alternating power-
holders a system based solely on corruption and “influence buying” does not pay off in
the long run. Thus, powerful private business in transition countries have an interest in
supporting  the  establishment  of  the  rule  of  law,  as  the  experience  of  the  Central
European transition countries have demonstrated. The authors maintain, “[I]t is true that
when businesses expect political turnover, they may respond by trying to influence the
entire political spectrum of parties. But attempting to influence all political players is
prohibitively costly if there are many parties with widely different political ideologies.”
Indeed, the report demonstrates that the democratisation process in transition countries
that did experience the return of the ex-Communist parties in power did not suffer. 
52 Despite what many feared then, the countries that switched from right-wing to left-wing
coalitions were able to keep key reforms intact. Instead of putting democracy in jeopardy,
these orderly transitions between political parties of different ideologies gave an air of
stability  to  the  new democracies,  rooted the  democratic  transition,  and — it  can be
argued — improved governance.
53 One can also conclude from a 2002 World Bank report on the first ten years of transition,
that  change  of  government  remains  an  important  precondition  for  furthering  the
democratization  process.47 Similarly,  the  authors  of  the  aforementioned  Carnegie
Endowment report claim that countries with frequent government turnover show the
best economic results. Post-Communist Poland experienced nine changes of government,
Estonia six, Hungary four, etc. between 1990 and 2002.
54 In contrast to countries that did experience an alternation of power without disrupting
the overall course of reforms, the authors list several (mainly post-Soviet) countries, as
examples. Limited alternation of power in Russia (together with the absence of a credible
political opposition) is seen as the main obstacle to governance in the country. Yet, there
is  a sense in which a large part  of  the democratisation literature comes up short  in
valuing  the  importance  of  political  stability  vis-à-vis  the  benefits  of  unblocking  the
political system. On the other hand, one could strongly argue that a complete disregard of
the importance of the stability factor (vs. government turnover at any cost) has led the
authors to design a paradoxical theoretical construct that could, if applied, cancel out the
democratic system that it is pretending to promote and improve. 
55 The  democratisation-related  literature  considered  in  the  writing  of  this  essay  does,
however, mention that countries with an absence of credible opposition remain less likely
to progress in the field of governance. This brings us to the issue of political stability in
light  of  a  situation  where  populist  political  parties  are  the  only  alternative  to  the
oligarchy maintained by a blocked political system – which is arguably the case in Serbia.
56 The debate  on government  turnover  as  a  precondition for  the  successful  process  of
democratisation of  a  country thus inevitably raises the question of  the international
historic  and  geopolitical  environment  in  which  the  very  process  of  democratisation
evolves.
57 In this section of the paper, the intention is to propose and test a hypothesis linking the
process of democratisation with the geopolitical factor. This consideration is especially
pertinent in the case of Serbia which finds itself in a unique situation of simultaneous
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clash and integration with  the  European Union and the  United States.  According  to
Freedom  House’s  “Freedom  in  the  World  Report  2008”  Serbia  is  the  only  country
classified as free that finds itself in a serious clash (over the territorial integrity of its
state in Kosovo) with arguably the main pillars of the liberal democratic world: the US
and the largest EU states.48 It is in this sense that Serbia’s democratisation process cannot
be compared to that of Poland, Hungary, Estonia etc. The case of Kosovo demands more
caution towards claims backing the absolute normative value of government turnover.
58 The aim of this paper is not to indulge in a culturally relativist exercise questioning the
normative quality of the concept of liberal democracy, or to enter into the Huntingtonian
debate  on  the  possibility  of  developing  a  democracy  outside  “the  West”  in  the
civilisational  sense.49 Rather,  the  intention  is  to  explore  whether  democratisation  is
intrinsically dependent on the geopolitical interests of the ‘West’, as well as to determine
if a country can successfully carry out a democratisation process despite serious political
disagreements with the EU and the US. Though it  is beyond the scope of this paper,
answering this question would shed some additional light on the academic discussion of
“liberal peace theory.”50
59 That said, democratisation processes are likely to be thwarted when facing unfavourable
geopolitical conditions. The situation in which post-Milosevic Serbia finds itself provides
an excellent example.  On one hand,  the US and the EU (with the exception of  some
member states) recognised Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, treating it as
a “unique case”, and consider its supervised independence a pragmatic solution aimed at
stabilising the Western Balkans. On the other hand, Serbia, invoking peremptory norms
of international  law and supported by a considerable number of  countries (including
Russia,  China, South Africa,  India,  Spain, Romania, Greece etc.),  defends its territorial
integrity and opposes formalisation of the de facto separation of its southern province. 
60 Serbia’s relationship with the EU is especially complicated. Formally, the two issues -
Serbia’s EU integration and its struggle to keep Kosovo - remain separate. Practically,
however, Serbia’s relationship with the EU could receive incongruous turns. On one hand,
Serbia  downgraded  diplomatic  relations  with  EU member  states  that  recognized  the
independence of Kosovo, while at the same time it entered into a contractual relationship
with  the  EU  with  the  signing  of  the  Stabilisation  and  Association  Agreement  in
Luxemburg 29 April 2008. The May 2008 elections will  have a decisive impact on the
future  of  Serbia’s  European  integration  process,  since  the  coalition  grouped  around
Kostunica’s DSS and the Radicals oppose the signing of the Agreement and threaten to
prvent its ratification should they acquire parliamentary majority after the elections. A
victory for the unconditionally pro-European forces assembled around the DS and the
likelihood of  an espousal  of  a  soft  approach to Kosovo’s  independence would have a
positive impact on the country’s membership perspective. 
61 A stalemate on integration and the severing of Serbia’s diplomatic relationship with the
EU could endanger its democratisation process. It would (though less likely) create an
unprecedented  situation  whereby  a  post-communist  country  proceeds  with  the
democratisation process while simultaneously maintaining a difficult, almost conflictual
relationship with the ‘West’. More probable however is that Serbia will lack the inner
strength  to  proceed  alone  with  the  post-Milosevic  democracy-building  and  overall
reforms when facing a serious severing of diplomatic relations with the ‘West’, coupled
with persistent instability in Kosovo. This would occur partially as the result of worsening
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economic conditions in the country. In this situation, the hypothesis positing dependence
of the democratisation process on the geopolitical factor will prove correct.
62 The boycott of the SRS and SPS by the ‘West’, besides being motivated by an ethical lack
of willingness to cooperate with the political party that took part in Milosevic’s regime,
also reflects the tension between Serbia, the EU and the US over the issue of Kosovo. 
63 Serbia’s ‘hard’ reaction to the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by US and most of
the EU Member States is not likely to result in a smooth relationship between Serbia and
the  EU.  SRS  participation  in  power  would  most  likely,  in  the  short  run,  render
cooperation with the EU difficult, which would in turn have a damaging effect on Serbia’s
democratisation process due to the possible ensuing lack of international support.
64 We have now reached the essence of Serbia’s paradoxical situation. On one hand, we
demonstrated  how  the  lack  of  government  turnover  negatively  affects  its
democratisation process. On the other hand, we reached a conclusion wherein, at least in
the short run, a substantial government turnover - and the rise of the Radical Party to
power - remains a dangerous prospect due to the international framework in which the
country’s democratisation evolves.
 
Conclusion – Tail wagging the dog
65 The problem of the “blocked political system”, as demonstrated, is not only that the will
of a large portion of the electorate remains underrepresented in the political institutions
that govern the country, but also, in the case of Serbia, due to the hitherto impossibility
of the Radical Party’s participation in power, serious political conflict exists only within
the block of democratic parties.  The SRS remains on the margins of  the struggle for
power, and as a consequence, acquires the virtually automatic support of protest voters.
Thus Serbia’s post-2000 political development resembles a situation where the tail wags
the dog: the attempt to fight a problematic opposition party by excluding it from power
actually strengthens the opposition’s position and in turn legitimises the public discourse
that renders the opposition party problematic in the first place.
66 The first attempt to end the conflict within the Democratic bloc was made by Boris Tadic,
President of Serbia and President of the DS. Namely, after being elected President of the
Republic in the summer of 2004, he refrained from attacking the government and led a
policy of rapprochement with the DSS and their coalition. Because of the cohabitation
with Kostunica’s DSS, Tadic was often criticized by the most socially progressive wings of
Serbian  society.  Consequently,  Tadic’s  position  led  to  the  political  profiling  (and
eventually electoral success) of the Liberal Democratic Party, while it also led him to win
many moderate centrist votes that did not belong to any political party per se. 
67 The victory in the second round of  the 2008 Presidential  elections demonstrated the
strong  electoral  potential  of  an  uncompromising  pro-European  Serbia,  as  well  as
politically  rewarding  Tadic’s  moderate  approach.51 Simultaneously,  the  2008  election
demonstrated  a  sign  of  the  normalisation  of  politics  in  Serbia  and  the  maturing  of
Serbia’s democracy regardless of the external instability related to Kosovo’s unilateral
declaration of independence. 
68 Predictions that the Radicals would contest the electoral results proved to be incorrect.
Once again, the SRS demonstrated willingness to play the game according to the rules
established on the 5th of  October 2000.  Only two hours after the closing of the polls,
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Tomislav Nikolic argued, “[w]e are going to count the ballots all night long, but as early as
now I am prone to say that Boris Tadic has won. I congratulate him and would like to
thank all people that went to the polls and voted. I promise to my electors that very soon
they shall  have new opportunity to vote for our program.”52 Nikolic was right – the
second Kostunica government soon dissolved and the new parliamentary elections were
scheduled. Tadic, on his behalf congratulated his opponent and said that he would meet
with him soon,  because he deserved respect on the basis  of  the number of  votes he
received.53
69 Some Serbian authors  are convinced that  government turnover will  lead towards an
improvement  of  Serbia’s  democracy.54 Concerning  SPS  support  for  Kostunica’s  first
minority government from 2004-2006, Pavlovic argues that the “deep polarization that
followed the change of the regime was watered down through a peaceful evolution of the
parties of the ex-regime”, singling out the SPS as the positive example and the SRS as a
negative example of party transformation.55 For him the fundamental concern is whether
there are political  parties  in Serbia  that  would,  in the event  of  an electoral  victory,
cancel-out  the  reforms  and  attempt  to  reestablish  the  pre-5th  October  situation.
Regarding this question, the author argued in December 2005 that two events will prove
essential for the successful stabilization of the democratic system in Serbia: adopting the
new Constitution, and the new electoral law. Should there be consensus on these, argued
the author at the time, all political parties would in a way become systemic – including
the Radicals.56
70 On 30 September 2006, one year after the aforementioned article was published ,  the
Radicals voted for the Constitution. There is a sense, however, that the adoption of the
Constitution was not sufficient to prove the Radicals’ loyalty towards the post- October
5th  Serbian  state.  Strong  patriotic  undertones  linking  the  adoption  of  the  Serbian
Constitution with the attempts of the Serbian government and president to countenance
the secessionism of  the Kosovo Albanians justified SRS participation in the vote and
referendum campaign even in the eyes of the staunchest opponents of post-Milosevic
Serbia in the electorate. For this reason, the Radicals need to be put to another ‘test’ in
order to further prove their willingness to play according to the rules set up after 5th
October 2000. A sign that they will act constructively was offered by the Radicals right
after 2007 Parliamentary elections. The constitution and electoral legislation limits the
period of negotiations for the formation of a new government, and should the political
parties fail  to reach an agreement, the country would have to vote once again. After
painful negotiations, the DS, DSS and the G 17 reached an agreement to form a coalition
government which was confirmed by the MPs of the parties 30 minutes before the legal
deadline. The Radicals were in a position to prevent the formation of the government and
provoke  new elections  through filibustering  (a  move they  frequently  utilized  in  the
post-2000 period) but they refrained from this, stating clearly that they would not resort
to obstructionism.57
71 Indeed, from the point of view of the international community and the Serbian post-
Milosevic power parties it may seem paradoxical to make political arrangements with the
Socialists while distancing themselves from the Radicals.58 After all it was Milosevic’s SPS,
not Seselj’s SRS, that played the greatest role in the devastating politics of the 1990s.
Having said that, the Radicals had often appeared the more uncompromising nationalists
than Milosevic; yet, it was he and his party that largely determined the fate of Serbia in
that period. 
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72 Stability  arguably  remains  a  basic  concern  when  considering  the  possibility  of
government turnover and the full political inclusion of Radicals and Socialists. Here, the
position of the EU and the US vis-à-vis the alternation of power in Serbia remains justified
due to a fear of the Radicals’ ability to fundamentally reverse the pace of reforms in the
country.
73 The Radical vote should not be sought after in nationalist discourse and politics. Since
2002,  as  a  result  of  the  negative  effects  of  their  exclusion from power,  the  SRS has
continuously attracted the protest vote of people unsatisfied with the nature of reforms
in Serbia, lack of social solidarity and corruption. Serbian elections are guided by two
dominant feelings:  fear of a return of the 1990s,  and anger directed against post-2000
political elite, corruption, the negative effects of transition, and the disregard for the rule
of law etc.  The Radicals were largely successful  in capitalising on the anger building
against  the  post-Milosevic  political  elite;  however,  they were  not  able  to  convince  a
sufficient number of voters that the reasons for fear of their return to power are vastly
exaggerated. As predicted by some analysts, the protest vote was not sufficient enough to
bring about an electoral victory for the Radicals.59 The essence of Tadic’s campaign in the
2008 Presidential elections was to whip up a fear of the Radicals. The plebiscitary nature
of Tadic’s campaign in the second round of the 2008 Presidential elections is such that
this can hardly be repeated. As indicated by a prominent Serbian politician, “this is the
last time Radicals were defeated on the basis of fear.”60 The May 2008 parliamentary
elections will present a test of this assertion since the pre-electoral rhetoric of Tadic’s
block largely resembles that of previous elections. The reasons for anger will persist, but
the reasons for fear will disappear once Serbia finds herself firmly on the EU track. It is
also possible that the May 2008 parliamentary elections will confound these predictions.
74 Since  the  Radicals  presently  do  not  face  a  serious  competing  political  force  in  the
opposition able to attract the votes of people dissatisfied with reforms, they are unlikely
to  disappear  from the  political  scene of  the  country.  Serbia’s  system,  in  spite  of  its
proportional  representation  system  in  parliamentary  elections,  is  affected  by  a
centripetal force that lends itself to polarisation, leaving Tadic’s DS on one side and the
Radicals  on  the  other.  The  January  Presidential  elections  undeniably  signaled  such
developments, and it is likely that the homogenisation of Serbia’s politics will continue in
the  May  parliamentary  elections.  Such  a  situation  will  undoubtedly  put  additional
pressure on Serbian political parties to do away with this form of blocked political system
and venture toward crossing the invisible line separating the pre- and post-2000 power
parties.
75 The  homogenisation  of  Serbia’s  politics  will  not  necessarily  represent  a  positive
development,  since,  should  it  occur,  it  is  bound to  divide  Serbia  into  two  polarised
political blocks: one led by the Democrats and other by the Radicals. In this way a new
kind of blocked political system might emerge, leaving no space for cooperation between
the two political parties (DS and SRS).61 Hence, further democratisation of Serbia can
occur only if the political culture changes dramatically enough to create possibilities for
cooperation and compromise between the DS and SRS, including agreement on the future
course of the country.
76 It remains to be seen whether Kosovo will play a crucial role in the upcoming 11th May
2008 parliamentary and local elections; whether the DS will manage to capitalise on the
electoral  success  of  its  presidential  candidate  and  the  subsequent  signing  of  the
Stabilisation and Association Agreement; and whether Kostunica and his party DSS will
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still  play  a  crucial  role  in  Serbia’s  politics.  Some  predictions  argue  that  Milosevic’s
Socialists might take over the role of the kingmaker from the DSS’s political block after
the May 2008 parliamentary and local elections.62 Regardless, one likely outcome of the
upcoming elections is, apart from the homogenisation of political spectrum in favour of
DS and SRS, a close result and the inability of any party or group of parties to form a
stable government. 
77 The situation in 2008 is however by no means similar to that of 2000 when, arguably, the
entire political discourse in the country, including that of the Radicals, shifted towards
gradual EU integration. The situation in Kosovo and the unresolved issue of cooperation
with the ICTY will continue to condition political developments in the country in the near
future, but not to the extent that they would completely reverse the pace of democratic
reforms. In the worst-case scenario, the disagreement with the international community
over  Kosovo  will  only  slow  the  reforms.  The  Serbian  population  has  still  to  fully
comprehend the devastating effect of Milosevic’s politics and its responsibility for the
wars of the 1990s. Yet this stabilisation is most likely to be achieved through a gradual
democratisation of the country, through the ‘external’ legitimisation of all mainstream
political actors, including the Radicals, and through securing the country’s EU future.
NOTES
1.  See Ginsborg (Paul), “Explaining Italy’s Crisis”, In Gundle, S. and Parker, S, The New Italian
Republic, Routledge, London, 1996; Sartori (Giovanni), Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for
Analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976; See Mammarella (Giuseppe), Italy after
fascism – A political history, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1966. This paper
borrowed the term “blocked political system” from political science analyzing the evolution of
the post-WW II political system in Italy, were despite a multitude of governments, a substantial
government turnover did not occur until the fall of the Iron Curtain. Geopolitical circumstances
after WW II produced a deformed political system in Italy that on the one hand saw a permanent
ruling Party (the Christian Democracy and the smaller parties that entered governing coalitions
on numerous occasions) and the permanent opposition (the Italian Communist Party), without
alteration.  This  political  system was usually referred to as “polarized pluralism” or “blocked
political system” and was marked by corruption, irresponsible rule, and clientelism by parties
permanently in power. 
2.  Hereinafter the Radicals or SRS.
3.  Democratic Opposition of Serbia – DOS - a group of political parties that overthrew Milosevic
from power.  Including the Democratic  Party (late Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic  and current
Serbian President Boris Tadic), Democratic Party of Serbia (Prime Minister Kostunica), G 17 Plus
(Dinkic)  and  other  smaller  parties.  Some parties  that  did  not  take  part  in  DOS  but  were  in
opposition  to  Milosevic’s  regime  took  part  in  the  post-2000  governments,  for  example  Vuk
Draskovic’s Serbian Renewal Movement.
4.  SRS and the Socialist Party of Serbia – hereinafter the Socialists, SPS.
5.  See Aslund (Anders), Building Capitalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002.
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6.  The term ‘democratic’ is conceived very broadly and is used according to the analysis of the
record of Serbian political parties while in power. The terms refers to the parties en bloc and not
to the individual members of these parties, bearing in mind the fact that certain, at times even
prominent members of Milosevic’s regime managed to infiltrate post-Milosevic political parties
and institutions. It does not imply that Radicals and Socialists are inherently undemocratic or
that they will not change their behaviour should they manage to govern Serbia in the future.
7.  Tomislav Nikolic, the presidential candidate of the SRS won 46.9% of the vote, but the voter
turnout was lower than the legal minimum (Article 6 of the Law on the Election of the President
of the Republic,  "Official  Gazette of  the Republic of  Serbia",  No.  1/90,  79/92 stipulated,  “The
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ABSTRACTS
Through  an  overview  of  the  relationship  between  the  ruling  democratic  parties,  the
international community, and the Radicals, this paper will attempt to answer the question of
whether the cost of this “blocked political system” (i.e. immobile democracy) is higher than the
continuous  exclusion  of  the  SRS  from  power.  In  this  way,  the  paper  will  touch  upon  some
fundamental dilemmas of political theory such as the toleration of the intolerant and the role of
the international factor in the democratisation process of a country. Moreover, a short overview
of  the  theories  of  democratisation  will  be  used  to  define  the  “blocked  political  system”
phenomenon.   The methodological  approach of  this  paper draws on an analysis  of  a  general
theory of democratisation, and a politico-historical analysis of Serbia from 2000-2008.
Grâce  à  une  vue  d'ensemble  de  la  relation  entre  les  partis  démocratiques  gouvernants,  la
communauté internationale, et les Radicaux, cet article tente de répondre à la question de savoir
si le coût du blocage du système politique (c'est-à-dire la démocratie immobile) est plus élevé que
la poursuite de l'exclusion du SRS du pouvoir. De cette manière, l'article abordera certains des
dilemmes fondamentaux de la théorie politique, tels que la tolérance de l'intolérance et le rôle du
facteur international dans le processus de démocratisation d'un pays. En outre, un bref aperçu
des théories de la démocratisation sera utilisé pour définir le phénomène du "système politique
bloqué". L'approche méthodologique de cette étude s'appuie sur l'analyse d'une théorie générale
de la démocratisation et d'une analyse politico-historique de la Serbie entre 2000 et 2008.
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